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Abstract: Strong forces lead to a withering of academia as it exists today. The major causal 
forces are the rankings mania, increased division of labor in research, intense publication 
pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university,” and inadequate 
organizational forms for modern research. Academia, in a broader sense understood as “the 
locus of seeking truth and learning through methodological inquiry,” will subsist in different 
forms. The conclusion is therefore pessimistic with respect to the academic system as it 
presently exists but not to scholarly endeavour as such. However, the transformation 
predicted is expected to be fundamental. 
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I. An Absurd Question? 
The academic community or academia, composed of universities, research institutes, 
academies, and other research venues, seems to be one of the most stable and long-lasting 
institutions in our society: 
– There are few other institutions that have existed for so many centuries and have survived 
so many adverse conditions such as political revolutions and economic crises. 
– Academia is populated by a rapidly increasing numbers of students. 
– Academia is supported by governments with huge financial resources flowing to it either 
directly, such as with state universities, or indirectly through all sorts of tax advantages. 
– The academic sector enjoys a high reputation among the media, politicians, and public 
officials, as well as among the public at large. 
– Academia can boast of great achievements in the past and the present. 
Based on these considerations, it seems almost ridiculous to ponder upon a possible 
disintegration or withering of academia. However, there are several aspects indicating that 
academia is not as sound as the above arguments might suggest and that academia as it exists 
today could radically change and even disappear. 
II. Forces Undermining Present-day Academia 
The following six aspects are the most important contributors to the withering away of 
academia.1 It is not denied that some of these aspects may also bolster the position of 
academia. The intention is, however, to focus on the more neglected forces tending to 
undermine academia. The six aspects are closely connected and often interact with each 
other. Nevertheless, it may be useful to consider them separately. 
1. The substance of scientific research matters less and less as externally defined measures 
take its place. Today, in many disciplines, the importance of a scientific idea and the 
position of a scholar are defined by rankings. What matters nowadays is the recognition 
produced by a general rankings system, normally based only on the quantity of scientific 
output, irrespective of quality. If quality is considered, this is done by counting the 
number of citations. Rankings provide simple measures of relative position in science, an 
aspect particularly useful for scholars in other disciplines and public decision makers. 
                                                 
1 In order to focus the discussion, only research is considered. A case could also be made with respect to 
education. 
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However, rankings are faced with many serious problems (they are extensively discussed 
in Osterloh and Frey, 2010, with a large number of references). For example, they 
disregard the simple fact that works are often cited because they are considered to be 
wrong and not because they are taken to be a valuable contribution to knowledge. 
Rankings have become of ever greater importance not only in the natural sciences and 
medicine but also in the social sciences, in particular economics.2 Professors are 
appointed, grants are received, and departments and whole universities are evaluated on 
the basis of publication rankings. In many cases, the decision makers involved do not take 
the trouble to read the respective works or to consider how much they contribute to our 
knowledge. Dependence on rankings has been substituted for consideration of content. 
2. Modern scientific activity is based on a marked division of labor. The scientific 
production process has increasingly been divided into neatly separated steps. For 
instance, in economics, it has become customary that a young scholar, usually a graduate 
student, collects the data, a second scholar undertakes the econometric analysis, and a 
third scholar interprets the results and writes the paper. As a consequence, single 
authorship has become an exception, and an increasing number of papers have three or 
even four authors. Each of them formally acknowledges full responsibility for the content 
of the paper. However, realistically none of the individual authors can confidently judge 
whether the other authors have done their work carefully and sincerely. The division of 
labor has led to a more efficient and rapid output of scientific results but favors partial 
views and discourages comprehensive considerations. Each participant in a particular 
scientific endeavour has to trust that the others do their work carefully. It is generally 
assumed that reliance on trust is well taken, but there is certainly no guarantee, especially 
when all the authors are under strong publication pressure. 
There is an analogy to the financial meltdown. Bankers giving mortgages to homeowners 
without adequate securities had little or nothing to do with the bankers constructing the 
respective derivatives and the same holds for the traders selling them to other banks and 
the public. Few people bothered to consider the systemic risks produced. A similar 
problem may occur in academia when the production process is dissected and few, if any, 
academics are able and willing to consider the overall picture. 
                                                 
2 The author is an economist and therefore knows about the situation in this field. Therefore, most of the 
examples given are from economics. 
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3. Publication pressure has strongly increased in academia over the past decades as a result 
of more intensive globalized scientific competition. This pressure has produced a strong 
rise in scholarly outputs in terms of publications, but it is not clear whether the quality has 
also risen or if it possibly has decreased.3 The incentives to publish are not necessarily the 
ideal ones to gain valuable new knowledge. The need to publish as much and as well as 
possible may influence the choice of: 
– Subjects studied. The subject should be manageable within the short time span given 
by the grant received or the position gained whereas content is of lesser or even no 
importance. 
– Methods used. To use already existing data is more manageable than to collect one’s 
own data. 
– Type of collaboration. It is useful to team up with already established scholars in 
order to raise the chance that a paper is accepted in a well-ranked journal. 
– Presentation of the results. An effort must be made to “sell” the results as novel and 
pertinent, although there is an incentive to suppress the works and insights of other 
scholars who are unlikely to be the editors or the referees of the journal in which one 
aspires to publish. This applies in particular to contributions by lesser known 
academics, in less prominent journals, and by scholars from other disciplines. 
– Extent scholars are ready to engage in “academic prostitution,” that is, to revise their 
paper according to the “suggestions” of the referees even if they know that they are 
questionable or even plainly wrong (see Frey 2003). 
The stronger the publication pressure, the stronger are these deviations from how scholars 
are ideally assumed to behave (Anderson et al. 2007). Overall, such practices undermine 
the claim of academia to pursue true knowledge. 
4. It can be predicted that academic misconduct and fraud have increased over recent 
decades.4 The major reason is not that scholars are less moral then they used to be. 
                                                 
3 In Australia, for example, the pressure to increase the number of publications resulted in a decrease of citations 
per article, that is, presumably a reduction in quality (Butler 2003). 
4 The most recent case attracting much attention relates to the famous primate researcher Marc Hauser of 
Harvard University who admitted to be guilty of science misconduct. 
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Instead, the incentives to cheat have greatly increased due to higher stress in academia.5 
Consider the situation of assistant professors with four-year contracts. They are well 
aware that if they have not performed sufficiently well in terms of publications their 
academic careers are doomed (see, e.g., Graber, Launov, and Wälde 2008; Frey 2009). If 
they realize during their third year that they have not produced enough publications, they 
can choose between two courses of action. They may continue with their work, but there 
is a high probability of dismissal when their contracts expire. They then have to choose a 
career outside academia. If, in contrast, they decide to resort to fraudulent behavior, they 
have to consider the probability of being detected and also the size of the punishment. 
The expected punishment for fraudulent behavior tends to be negligible because it is not 
likely that a well-executed deception will be detected. For example, it is difficult or even 
impossible to find out whether the data collected have been slightly manipulated in order 
to produce the desired result. However, even if the manipulations are detected, the 
punishment is likely to be minor. The academic institutions in which the assistant 
professors work have an incentive to suppress the fact that fraud took place because it 
taints their reputations. They therefore tend to cover up the fraud and just ask the 
respective scholars to silently leave. Moreover, the culpable scholars can adduce a large 
number of defensive arguments why the “error” happened.  
In countries rich in litigations, a university does not find it easy to legally prove a 
wrongdoing and therefore prefers to cover up any fraud. In the worst case, the 
wrongdoers are dismissed, which leaves them in the same situation as if they had not 
resorted to fraud. They have to leave academia. Normally, the sectors outside academia 
have little interest in what they often consider internal scholarly disputes, so that a 
dismissal has little or no negative consequences for the future careers of cheaters. Due to 
the heavy publication pressure, a choice between “cheating” and “not cheating” in many 
cases will be decided in favor of the former. 
It might be argued that the situation is much different for accomplished scholars with 
tenure. It is true that such scholars do not face dismissal, but nowadays they nevertheless 
are also under considerable pressure to keep up their publishing rate. A scholar who 
published much in the past is expected to keep on doing so; otherwise, that particular 
                                                 
5 More stress has been shown to increase the tendency to cheat, see James and Hendrickson (2008), James 
(2009), and De Clercq and Dakhli (2009). 
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scholar is accused of becoming lazy. Such scholars therefore are not immune to 
committing fraud—but they do it in different ways than assistant professors. For instance, 
they ask their graduate students to collect data, but, as long as the data collected are not in 
direct contradiction to the theories they want to communicate, they have no incentive to 
check the research although they sign as coauthors. Only in rare cases are senior authors 
made responsible for the fraud of coworkers because everyone understands that they 
cannot check everything. The recent scandals by fake stem-cell lines produced by Hwang 
Woo-Suk or the duplicated graphs by Jan Hendrik Schön suggest that it is relatively easy 
to publish in the most prestigious journals such as Nature and Science using fabricated 
data. Although falsified experiments in principle can be detected, there are few incentives 
and possibilities to undertake serious replications in the social sciences (see Hamermesh, 
2007, for the case of economics). 
There are a large number of (additional) ways to commit fraud in academia. It includes 
stealing ideas from other scholars; the fabrication, falsification, modification and theft of 
data; suppression of references to the work of others; exchange of favors to become an 
author of a piece of research by offering money, authorship in another paper, or sexual 
services; and plagiarism of texts. 
It can be expected that, due to the higher publication pressure now prevalent in academia, 
fraud is committed quite often—or at least more often than academic institutions allow us 
to believe. This prediction has rarely been seriously analyzed based on empirical facts. 
The meta-analysis by Fanelli (2009) collects 18 surveys that met the necessary criteria. 
Two percent of the researchers questioned were willing to confess to having acted in a 
clearly fraudulent way. However, lower-level fraud is more extensive. About 10 percent 
admitted questionable practices such as “dropping data points based on a gut feeling” or 
“failing to present data that contradict one’s previous research.” The figure for 
“questionable research practices” applies to 34 percent of researchers. When it came to 
airing suspicions about other scholars, the number for serious fraud strongly increased. 
The meta- analysis suggests that 14 percent of researchers have seen their colleagues 
fabricate, falsify, or modify data. Fanelli (2009, 1) believes that it appears likely that this 
is a conservative estimate of the true prevalence of scientific misconduct. Although 
Fanelli’s research collects the best evidence presently available, it concentrates almost 
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exclusively on the natural sciences.6 There is little known about the extent of fraud in the 
social sciences. On the whole, there are only bits and pieces of evidence.7 In particular, it 
has not been empirically established that academic fraud has risen over the last decades. 
But, there is indirect evidence, namely the increased attention academia and government 
bodies pay to research misconduct. Many academies of sciences have codified rules 
against academic fraud. In the United States, the government has been moved to establish 
an Office of Research Integrity; in a recent study, it comes to the conclusion that there is 
“an alarming picture of underreporting” (Titus, Wells, and Rhoades 2008, 981). 
Academic fraud has serious consequences for the existing system of scholarly research. 
There are negative external effects far beyond the persons committing the fraud. Most 
important, the high reputation and the almost “sacred” nature of scientific research and of 
its insights may break down, contributing to a meltdown of academia. 
5. A quite different force contributing to a withering of academia relates to the public good 
nature of the concept and name of “academia,” in particular of “universities.” Due to 
the demand of a highly competitive environment to attract as many paying students as 
possible, universities have engaged in aggressive sales pitches and have lowered their 
standards in order to attract a larger number of paying students. It is not unheard of that 
students who have to pay a considerable amount of money believe that they have acquired 
the “right” to pass their exams and to be rewarded with a degree upon completion of their 
studies. This holds in particular for the countless summer courses for foreign students as 
well as for the numerous Executive Masters in many different areas going far beyond 
being restricted to Executive Masters in Business Administration. These students are not 
expected to gain the same level of education and aptitudes as the “normal” students, but 
they profit to the same extent from the high reputation of a particular university. 
The high reputation of a university is a public good shared by all professors and students, 
but it is undermined by having too many students of lower quality. The leadership of a 
                                                 
6 An exception is List et al. (2001) who undertook a survey among participants at the American Economic 
Association Meeting. See also Hand (2007) and Martinson, Anderson, and De Vries (2005, 2006). 
7 An interesting but very partial approach is the use of Benford’s Law to check whether data are fabricated. 
According to Tödter (2009), violations of this Law occurred in 25 percent of the articles suggesting falsification 
of data. See also Diekmann (2007) and Günnel and Tödter (2009). Another technique is to look at referencing 
errors (e.g., Harzing 2002). 
8 
 
university with a high reputation of course is aware of this fact and seeks to maintain 
quality. However, the countervailing forces are strong because the pernicious effect of 
diluting the good name of universities is only visible in the long run (after most university 
presidents have already left). In contrast, bringing in paying students raises short-term 
revenue that can be used to finance research. 
6. Traditional academia may also wither away because the existing organizational form is 
no longer adequate for the way academic activities are undertaken today. Scholars no 
longer need to be at a particular university in order to benefit from a research 
environment. Today, many scholars have most research contacts with colleagues from 
other scientific institutions instead of their own. Also, they no longer need the facilities of 
their own university, in particular its library, as they can access all that they need via the 
Internet. In addition, the globalization of research has made scholars more mobile and as 
a result many belong to various universities and scientific venues at the same time as can 
readily be seen from the many affiliations indicated in publications (including this 
author). 
Students also have disassociated themselves from particular universities when they take 
their courses online and combine courses from different universities. Although they get 
their certificates from one particular university, their education is a reflection of many 
different sources. In principle, the body giving the certificate need not offer any courses at 
all and need not even be an academic institution. 
Both with respect to research and teaching, the traditional universities have lost much of 
their traditional functions. This contributes to the withering of academia as understood 
today. 
The six forces undermining present-day academia have all become increasingly important 
over time. It is not argued that they did not exist in the past; the picture of an ideal traditional 
academia is certainly mistaken. However, the undermining forces discussed have gained in 
strength relative to the forces supporting established venues. There may well be a “tipping 
point” situation. The existing establishments of academia may seemingly flourish while the 
forces leading to their disintegration are hardly visible, and partly suppressed. A sequence of 
shocks, such as well-publicized cases of major fraud in academia, may lead to a sudden 
change in view. Academia may then receive bad press, be ridiculed, and quickly lose ground. 
Under these circumstances, the forces presently supporting the existing academic community 
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will be undermined. In particular, having a century old tradition may prove to be a 
disadvantage instead of an advantage because it may suggest that it has outlived its 
usefulness. The large financial resources flowing from government into the academic sector 
may no longer be interpreted as a means to perform an essential function but rather as a 
striking example of waste. The high reputation presently enjoyed may make it a particularly 
attractive target for destruction as it showers attention on the persons acting as destroyers. 
The great achievements of academia in the past may well be reinterpreted as purely negative. 
For example, the great insights gained in nuclear physics may mainly be perceived as 
contributing to the destruction of mankind. The great achievements of academia may at least 
be put into doubt or may simply be taken as irrelevant for today’s world. 
III. Where Is Academia Heading? 
It would be mistaken to assume that academic activities would vanish and all science 
disappears. The need to seriously and methodically deal with the problems in our world 
certainly remains. However, if the arguments discussed above are valid, the institutional 
character of academia will fundamentally be transformed. In particular, the trend towards 
large, well-funded university campuses and huge research centers with the concomitant 
building structures will disappear. 
On the basis of the six undermining aspects discussed above one may speculate in what 
direction this transformation will go. 
1. Rankings. The rankings mania may be expected to lead to more and more rankings, which 
then will be aggregated to super rankings and super rankings of super rankings … until it 
becomes clear to everyone that numerical evaluations of academic research lead to 
nothing, and people return to evaluate the content of science. Signs are already visible. 
Good researchers now seek to collaborate with “interesting,” “promising,” and 
“extraordinary” colleagues irrespective of how these scholars are ranked. 
2. Division of labor in research. It is difficult to conceive that this tendency will be 
discontinued. However, it is likely that “specialists on systemic effects” trying to 
understand the overall picture will emerge and will be trained. The constant demand for 
interdisciplinary research points in this direction. However, under the present conditions, 
it essentially means the end of a career for a (young) scholar because the rankings are 
defined in terms of contributions to a particular discipline. Only some older scholars, 
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who are less in need to meet the publication demands by the present academic system, 
can to some extent afford to work seriously in an interdisciplinary way. 
3. Publication pressure. The emphasis on quantitative publication and mechanically 
structured qualitative measures is likely to end when it becomes clear that it does not 
create the most relevant and insightful scholars (Osterloh and Frey 2010). To accept 
open-access publications on the Internet with minimal or no interventions by referees may 
be a first step. 
An extreme and idealistic solution would be to publish scientific contributions 
anonymously. After all, it should not matter who wrote an article but only whether its 
content enlarges our knowledge. There are, of course, many problems with such a 
solution. An obvious one is that scholars would no longer have an extrinsic incentive to 
publish. Nevertheless, the force of this incentive argument should not be overestimated. 
Many scholars are intrinsically motivated to a considerable extent and would still pursue 
their research and would still publish even if their name was not published. In Wikipedia, 
the entries are written and published by anonymous persons, and it nevertheless 
flourishes. Similarly, some high quality newspapers and weeklies do not reveal the author 
of an article, The Economist, edited in the UK, being an example. 
4. Academic fraud. Once rankings have lost their prominent role as evaluation measures and 
the publication pressure is eased, scholars will have fewer incentives to cheat for career 
purposes. However, it would be naïve to assume that fraud will disappear. The 
recognition by other scholars and fame in the public are still potent factors inducing 
people to deviate from the ideal behavior of a scholar. 
Various other suggestions have been put forward to reduce or even eliminate academic 
fraud. For instance, a scholar associated with the U.S. Office of Research Integrity 
advances the following recommendations (Anderson 2009): Greater attention to scientific 
misconduct; development and articulation of national and institutional policies on 
research conduct and integrity; international cooperation in inquiries, investigations, and 
adjudication of cross-national misconduct; alignment of institutional and national policies 
on research integrity; and intensified and improved training in the responsible conduct of 
research. These recommendations are certainly helpful, but it is doubtful whether they are 
effective. As pointed out above, the scholars and universities involved have an interest in 
11 
 
not revealing the academic fraud but to suppress it. They therefore will engage only 
halfheartedly in the recommendations just listed. 
5. University image. The term “university” has already been diluted to a large extent. In 
many countries, lower level institutions may officially use the name though their research 
performance is not of the same standard as traditional universities. For scholars who plan 
to be active in the future, the reputation of the university in which they work will be of 
little importance as their own prestige will depend more on their personal achievement. 
They have little reason to oppose the dilution of a university’s reputation and name 
because they are no longer committed to one particular university. This development is 
likely to continue at an even more rapid rate until the title of “university” is no longer of 
any value. 
6. Dissolution of universities. The existing universities with their campuses and buildings 
are likely to slowly disappear and virtual identities take up the role of a “scholarly 
community,” which is no longer related to a particular venue at a particular place. 
IV. Conclusions 
It has been argued that there are strong forces undermining the present-day academic system. 
The major forces identified are the rankings mania, the increased division of labor in 
research, the intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of 
“university,” and the independence of scholars and students from particular universities. 
These forces are seen to lead to a meltdown of academia. In particular, the present university 
system is expected to radically change and thus a century old tradition to die. 
Academia in the broader sense, that is, “the locus of seeking truth and learning through 
methodological inquiry,” will continue to subsist in different forms because it performs a vital 
function in society. The conclusion therefore is pessimistic only with respect to the academic 
system as it presently exists but not to scholarly endeavour as such. However, the 
transformation predicted is expected to be fundamental and to perhaps take place sooner than 
one might think. 
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